






This chapter deals with some of the different senses that the term ‘intention’ has in pragmatics, 
and the way they are related to each other. I shall begin by distinguishing one employment of 
the term, which belongs to our folk psychological practices of understanding actions in terms 
of reasons, from a more technical use, related to the aboutness of language. After a brief historical 
sketch, I describe the intentional approach to pragmatics as an attempt to account for the inten-
tionality of language (its aboutness) in terms of intentional action. I will do so by explaining the 
basic tenets of two very influential proposals: the Gricean theory of conversation and speech 
act theory. This chapter finishes with a review of contemporary debates on the foundations of 
pragmatics where intentions have a predominant role to play.
‘Intention’: two definitions
There are two very different notions, or clusters of notions, commonly associated with ‘inten-
tion’ and various cognate terms. Firstly, the word ‘intention’ stems from our ordinary practices of 
understanding actions in terms of goals and reasons. For instance, there could be different ways 
of accounting for an agent’s performance in intentional terms, according to Anscombe’s (1957) 
classical approach to the issue:
(1) Mary turned on the light intentionally.
(2) While walking the corridor, Mary had the intention to turn on the light.
(3) Mary pressed the switch with the intention to turn on the light.
Attaining a unified account of these multiple uses has become one of the main tasks of the 
theory of action (Setiya 2011), but for our topic it may suffice to know that most authors con-
verge today on what is called the standard theory of action. This is the idea that intentions accom-
plish such an explanatory role because they are psychological states in the minds of agents with 
causal effects on their behaviour. In this example, the light turned on as a causal effect of Mary’s 
cognitive state of intention. Therefore, such an account is causal and cognitive. Even if it is well 
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extended, it has been contested on several occasions, and we must bear in mind that it is just one 
option among others in order to make sense of this folk psychological practice.
Secondly, there is a technical use of the same term ‘intention’, usually (but not exclusively) 
associated with its cognate ‘intentionality’ – a seeming homonymy that is utterly misleading. To 
have intentionality, be intentional, or be intentionally directed is to be about something else, or 
being referred to something else, something that may not even exist. Coined by medieval scho-
lastics (the Latin verb intendo means to point at, or aim at something), the term was recovered 
by nineteenth-century psychologist and philosopher Franz Brentano (1995: 68), who famously 
claimed that all mental states, and only them, have intentionality. That means that beliefs, desires, 
and also intentions (in the former cognitive sense) are psychological states directed towards 
something beyond themselves. For instance: John’s belief that the shop is open is about the shop, 
which is not in his mind, but out there. Mary’s intention to turn on the light, which is a mental 
state occurring in her mind, is about the light, which is at the other side of the corridor.
Despite Brentano, there seem to be many non-mental candidates for intentionality, at least 
apparently. Some of them are present in the natural world, as when we claim that smoke on the 
horizon informs us about fire, footprints on the floor tell us that some animal has been there, 
or stripes in a bug’s abdomen alert us to its poison; some others belong to human culture, like 
signs, maps, or language, the latter of which is a prominent case of intentionality since linguistic 
expressions have meanings. Members of this highly heterogeneous group of phenomena will 
require very different explanations (Searle 1983; Haugeland 1990; Millikan 2004), and those 
explanations must somehow fit together. Finding out the way they do is one of the main tasks 
of the theory of content.
The intentional approach to language is an attempt to bring both senses of ‘intention’ 
together by reaching an explanation of the intentionality of language in terms of the intentional 
performances of social agents. In a nutshell, the idea is that language has a meaning, and is thus 
intentional (in the sense of aboutness), because it is employed by people with certain intentions (in 
the folk psychological sense). This insight was in the origins of pragmatics as a study of language 
in use, and different champions in this field often differ on the way the intentions of agents may 
help us explain the intentionality of their language. But, before facing those alternatives, a quick 
look back at history may help us understand their significance.
Historical perspective
Intentional approaches to language appeared quite recently in the analytic philosophy of lan-
guage. At the beginning of the twentieth century, authors like Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, 
or the young Ludwig Wittgenstein were focused on the problem of intentionality in its two 
main varieties: thought and language. One of their main aims was to explain what it is that 
allows our thoughts and language to be about the world, a problem they approached in a twofold 
way: by means of semantics on one hand, and syntax on the other. In contrast to this, in the 
interwar period, philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein himself, John L. Austin, or Peter Straw-
son began to consider language as a product of human action, built into the social environment, 
and not just as an abstract, semantic/syntactic structure. The novelty of their account was that 
they searched for an explanation of the intentionality of language not in its direct relation to the 
world, but through the mediation of speakers and hearers, who employ that language in their 
ordinary lives. Thanks to those authors, the way was open for an account of the intentionality of 
language in terms of the intentional character of human action.
By the middle of the twentieth century, two conceptions of this task were proposed, initi-
ated by Grice and Searle, respectively. Grice’s proposal aimed to explain linguistic meaning in 
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terms of the communicative intentions of speakers, together with the inferential capacities of 
hearers. In contrast to this, Searle’s proposal was based on Austin’s incipient ideas on the nature 
of ‘speech acts’ – actions we perform in saying something. The former initiated a branch of 
pragmatics mostly focused on communicative processes, whereas the latter aims to explain the 
occurrence of social performances that imply changes in speakers’ normative status (i.e., new 
rights and obligations arising from the performance of promises, donations, orders, warnings, 
invitations, and so on). Both conceptions of pragmatics have proved highly influential: Gricean 
proposals were decisive for the later appearance of relevance theory, giving rise to cognitive 
pragmatics and intention-based semantics, whereas Searlean speech act theory has been widely 
applied beyond linguistics, in fields like psychology, artificial intelligence, sociology, legal studies, 
or literary theory.
Despite both being fruitful, the two trends are in fact quite an ‘uneasy couple’ (Dascal 2003: 
507). They are sometimes considered as complementary theories, and sometimes as competing 
accounts. I will show in the next section that the different role accomplished by folk psychologi-
cal intentions in each of them may be responsible for this tense relationship.
Critical issues and topics
Communicative intentions and conversation
I have said that Grice’s aim was to reach an explanation of linguistic meaning in terms of com-
municative intentions, which are those intentions agents have when they try to communicate 
something. Those intentions, as any other kind of intentions, are defined in terms of goals: the 
speaker said whatever she said because she was pursuing something. What is specific about those 
intentions is that speakers rely on the capacity of others to detect their own intentions by means 
of inference. In this way, the sort of communicative intentions that explain communicative 
actions are, according to Grice (1989), threefold. A speaker who tries to communicate some-
thing intends at the same time:
(1) to produce a particular response in her hearer,
(2) to make her hearer recognise that she is intending (1), and
(3) to fulfil (1) on the basis of her fulfilment of (2).
Communicational utterances would thus be performed by speakers with the intention to affect 
hearers by means of their very recognition of that same intention. Accordingly, understanding 
would be a matter of utterances being recognised by hearers as being intentionally produced by 
speakers in order to be recognised as intentional (of course, ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’ are used here in 
a wide sense, since Grice’s account is not meant to be restricted to oral communication).
At first sight, this account certainly looks stilted. Why could we not simply say that, in com-
municating, the speaker intends to convey some information to her hearer? The reason this could 
not suffice may be grasped by means of an example: imagine we have run out of milk at home; 
I would like my partner to buy some and, in order to attain this, I leave an empty milk bottle on 
the kitchen table. I don’t mind if she realises that I have done this on purpose, and she does not 
realise so, but she does discover that we have ran out of milk, and she buys some. Now, even if 
I succeed in what I intended, could we say that I communicated to her that we had no more milk? 
Grice’s intuition would be that I did not. I would have managed to convey that piece of informa-
tion to her, but I would not have communicated it to her because I did not intend her to recognise 
that I was intending to convey that piece of information to her. In order to have a fully fledged 
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case of communication, the speaker’s performance must be explainable as a fulfilment of complex 
communicative intentions along the lines of the threefold kind I have sketched.
Since Grice’s initial attempt to define communicative intentions as self-referential exhibited 
fundamental problems (see Avramides 1989), Sperber and Wilson (1986: 58) proposed an alter-
native account, along the lines of the Gricean proposal, but distinguishing between informative 
and communicative intentions. In their view, any act of communication would respond to a 
first-order informative intention (the intention to convey information to others) and, at the 
same time, to a second-order communicative intention (the intention to make that informative 
intention manifest to the hearer). Communicative intentions would thus be second order (that 
is, referred to other intentions).
One way or the other, communicative intentions would be the basis of what Grice called 
non-natural meaning (meaningnn for short), which is the kind of intentionality that characterises 
language, in contrast to more simple cases of natural meaning (as in the smoke on the horizon, 
footprints, or the bug’s stripes). Grice’s seminal idea is that language has meaningnn because it is 
the effect of actions that respond to communicative intentions.
Notice that meaningnn was not involved in the previous example, even if it could be a case of 
successful communication (in case I intended my intention to be recognised, and succeeded in 
it). In order to have a fully fledged case of linguistic communication, we would additionally need 
the communicative intention to be fulfilled by means of some linguistic expression. The speaker 
must produce an utterance that is a token of a linguistic type, that is, an individual occurrence 
of a meaningful sentence. For instance, instead of leaving an empty bottle on the kitchen table, 
I could have left a note saying, ‘We’ve run out of milk!’
It may look simple, but difficulties arise for the Gricean project when we make this little change 
in the story. When communication is based on linguistic means, it seems to rely on the agents’ 
awareness of the meaning of the linguistic types employed – that is, on their knowledge of what 
is said by the sentences they utter. I know, for instance, that my partner knows that a note that 
says, ‘We’ve run out of milk!’ means that we have run out of milk. However, if Grice’s aim was to 
reach an explanation of the intentionality of language (the aboutness of meaningnn) in terms of the 
intentions of agents, and he took for granted that the instruments agents employ already have their 
own intentionality (given that expressions would have some previous meaning), his account would 
leave its target unexplained. Unlike the case of the empty bottle, whose meaning on the table is 
fully explained by what I intend to do by leaving it there, the case of the note is more complex. 
It does not have a meaning because I left it there: I left it there because it already had a meaning!
The problem is that the verb ‘mean’ has a tricky double sense here: when we claim that a 
speaker ‘means’ something, we are talking about what she intends to do, or say, which is a matter 
of psychological explanations of her actions in terms of reasons; in contrast to this, when we 
claim that a sentence ‘means’ something, we are talking about what it refers to, which is a matter 
of the intentionality of language. We are not claiming that a speaker has a ‘meaning’ when we 
say that he means something, and we are not claiming that a sentence has a ‘reason’ to do what it 
does when we claim that it means something. This may look like a platitude, but it could be the 
source of much theoretical confusion in the field.
Now, if we want to stick to an account of intentionality in terms of intentional action, the 
problem is how and why do sentences mean at all, besides or beyond what agents mean by using 
them? What would explain the intentionality of linguistic expressions themselves? The Gricean 
project requires some further account of meaningnn in terms of communicative intentions, since 
otherwise the intentional account of the intentionality of language would be painfully circular.
Grice and most post-Gricean accounts have pursued this explanation in terms of conven-
tions: by being systematically employed to perform some communicational purposes, linguistic 
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expressions acquired some sort of ‘timeless’ meaning that is independent of the ‘occasion’ mean-
ing they may have while being used by any particular speakers (Grice 1989: 145–338). Speakers 
make use of sentences because there is something that is what is said by them; but, at the same 
time, the meaningnn of a sentence is an effect of its having become a conventional instrument by 
which agents intend to say what they say. In that way, linguistic expressions have an intentional 
content precisely because they are conventional means to fulfil very particular communicative 
intentions (even if speakers may use them in order to fulfil quite different intentions on par-
ticular occasions).
In that way, speakers’ linguistic utterances rely on the intentionality of linguistic types but, at 
the same time, the intentionality of linguistic types stems from those communicative intentions 
conventionally associated to their utterances. Both what speakers say in their utterances and what 
is said by the sentences they employ would be explained in terms of communicative intentions 
(either those of the particular agent, for the utterance, or those conventionally associated to that 
linguistic type, for the sentence).
Illocutionary intentions and speech acts
Let’s now look at the example of the note from a different perspective: the one of speech acts 
theory, whose main aim is not to account for communication, but for the sort of deeds that we 
perform by means of language, and the way those deeds transform the social scene. In this case, 
my note would constitute what is called a speech act: an utterance that would make it the case that 
agents are committed to new rights and obligations. And, following Austin (1962), my perfor-
mance could be described as comprising three different nested sub-actions, which are different 
descriptions of what I actually did: firstly, I wrote something on a piece of paper – something 
that, as a matter of fact, has some linguistic structure, syntax, and meaning. That is what Austin 
called the ‘locutionary act’. Secondly, in leaving this note, I said that we had run out of milk, and 
indirectly requested my partner to buy some. Those are, according to Austin, ‘illocutionary acts’, 
and they are not just a matter of meaning, but of what he called force – since my utterance actu-
ally makes it the case that I performed these deeds. And thirdly, by means of these illocutionary 
acts, I may have attained some expected goals, like having the milk bought, and obtained some 
unexpected results, like annoying my partner because it was my turn to buy it.
The Austinian perspective is another sort of intentional approach to language, since all three 
sub-actions may be explained in terms of the intentions agents had while performing them. 
That is: if we asked for the reasons why I did what I did, my act of leaving the note may be 
described as a fulfilment of
(1) my locutionary intention to write some words; of
(2) my illocutionary intention to tell something to my partner, or of the one to indirectly request 
something from her; and of
(3) my perlocutionary intention to have milk bought for tomorrow.
Nonetheless, it is important to realise that the role of intentions is crucially different in the 
case of illocutionary acts. It seems that the description of the utterance as an illocutionary act 
immediately implies the attribution of the illocutionary intention to the agent, whereas that is 
not the case with the other acts, which may be unintentionally performed. That is: I may have 
written some sentence unintentionally, and I may have annoyed my partner unintentionally, but 
I may not have made a request unintentionally. If I made a request, then I was intending to do it. 
Illocutions are constituted by intentions in a way locutions and perlocutions are not.
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This is a feature that is not exclusive of illocutionary acts: there are a good number of actions 
that are constituted by the intentions to perform them: to communicate, as we saw in the previ-
ous section, is a clear case, together with many other non-communicative deeds, such as ‘attack-
ing’, ‘resting’, or ‘achieving’. In the case of both communicative and illocutionary acts, a social 
trait is added, since their successful performance is constituted not just by the fulfilment of the 
intention to perform them, but also by the hearer’s recognition of that same intention. In this 
sense, communicative acts and illocutionary acts seem equal.
However, despite this similarity, according to Searle (1969), illocutionary acts are not mere 
communicative acts, since the former are constituted by rules, whereas the latter are merely 
regulated by them. Regulative rules apply to activities that are logically prior to such rules, and 
independent of them. Think about an activity like fishing: there may be many rules on what, 
when, and how to fish, rules that perhaps indicate the most efficient ways to do it, or ways in 
which it is allowed. However, the activity of fishing is not itself constituted by those rules: it 
is merely regulated by them. One may fish not following any rule in particular, and that may 
still count as ‘fishing’. In contrast to this, constitutive rules are logically prior to the activity in 
question. They make the activity possible in the first place, and there is no such activity if the 
agent is not following the rules. Classic examples are games like chess or baseball: people did 
not first begin to play chess, and then decide to regulate their practice according to rules – rules 
themselves constitute the practice. In order to perform actions governed by constitutive rules, an 
agent must know those rules, and that he is acting according to them. Illocutionary intentions, 
from this perspective, are those agents have when their aim is to follow such constitutive rules.
In Searle’s opinion, the Gricean approach to language neglects the fact that speech acts are 
like chess, not like fishing. The sort of rationality Grice envisaged to account for communication 
is merely constrained by maxims of a regulative kind: it only requires intelligent agents, able to 
fulfil their communicative purposes and to guess those of others by inference. But that is not 
enough for the performance of speech acts, according to Searle, since speakers must additionally 
know the illocutionary rules in use in their community, and act according to them, in order to 
perform illocutionary acts. One must know what it is to make a promise in order to make one, 
or what it is to get married in order to do so. One must have the intention to perform these 
deeds, that is, to follow the rules that constitute those practices.
A theory of speech acts ought to describe and explain, in Searle’s view, those constitutive 
rules, and the method he proposes for this is to analyse the meaning of illocutionary verbs (like 
requesting, offering, inviting, promising, or informing), which are explicit indicators of their 
illocutionary force. A study of those meanings would be the best way to make their rules of use 
explicit, and thus shed light on the nature of speech acts. This is a move that seems counter to the 
intentional approach to language, giving conceptual priority to linguistic meaning over agential 
intentions, and some authors have criticised it as a semanticization of pragmatics.
More relevant is the idea that speech acts theory attributes a constitutive role to intentions 
in the performance of speech acts. Whenever a speech act is performed, the speaker must have 
had the intention to act according to some instituted rule – otherwise, no speech act was actu-
ally performed. However, not all intentions manifested in speech have this constitutive role. 
The speaker’s act may also respond to other intentions in a contingent way, since we may also 
express intentions by means of speech that are not constitutive of our speech acts. For instance, by 
requesting someone to do something we express our desire to have that thing done; by thank-
ing, we express our gratitude. In this sense, most (but not all) speech acts count as expressions 
of specific mental states, called their ‘sincerity condition’ (Searle 1969, 62). In particular, some 
speech acts have intentions as their sincerity condition. The case of promises is paradigmatic in 
this respect, since they have a future intention of the speaker as their sincerity condition (that 
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is: whenever a speaker promises to do something, she expresses her intention to do it). In these 
cases, the role of the expressed intention is not constitutive: even if the speaker did not have 
the intention she expressed, the speech act did occur (her speech act would be insincere, but 
still committing, giving rise to new rights and obligations). In contrast to this, as I said before, it 
seems that constitutive, illocutionary intentions must be present whenever the speech act takes 
place, even in insincere performances.
To summarise: on one hand, Gricean communicative intentions are intentions speakers have 
when they try to influence their hearers by means of their recognition that they are trying to 
influence them. On the other hand, Austinian/Searlean illocutionary intentions are the inten-
tions to perform speech acts, which are those that modify the normative status (rights and obli-
gations) because they are constituted by socially instituted rules. Those two approaches are not 
clearly compatible, given the different roles intentions accomplish in each one of them, and the 
different sort of rationality they attribute to agents. Grasping this difference is essential to navi-
gate the current literature on pragmatics whenever the complex notion of intention is at stake.
Recent work and future directions
My aim in this final section is to pinpoint recent debates on the foundations of pragmatics 
where intentions have an important role to play. Hopefully, understanding on those debates may 
be earned from the distinctions made in the previous section.
The semantics/pragmatics interface
A very influential proposal coming from the Gricean trend is Sperber and Wilson’s relevance 
theory (1986). Theirs is a work that puts speech acts in a corner, and definitely focuses on the 
problem of communication. In their view, two main models account for this phenomenon: 
the code model and the inferential model. The code model would explain communication as 
the process by which a speaker transfers some message by means of a code, while understanding 
would consist of the audience decoding that message. In contrast to this, the inferential model 
claims that communication may be attained without the help of any shared code, just relying on 
the inferential capacities of the agents. The example of the empty milk bottle (in case it fulfilled 
my communicative intentions) is a case of purely inferential communication, whereas that of 
the note implies a code.
One basic idea behind Sperber and Wilson’s proposal is that code models are not autono-
mous, but always depend on inferential capacities. They claim that there is no way to make sense 
of communication and understanding as a simple process of coding and decoding. One of the 
main reasons they adduce for this is that codes are not specific enough by themselves to express 
the thoughts or psychological attitudes of speakers:
It is true that a language is a code which pairs phonetic and semantic representations of 
sentences. However, there is a gap between the semantic representations of sentences 
and the thoughts actually communicated by utterances. This gap is filled not by more 
coding, but by inference.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 9)
Such a radical unevenness between mental attitudes and sentence meanings is argued to have 
two quite disturbing effects, which are the two sides of the same coin: firstly, we could not make 
the content of a speaker’s intention fully explicit by simply indicating a sentence that expresses 
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it; and secondly, it would be impossible in principle to define the meaning of a given sentence 
in terms of the content of a speaker’s intentions.
There is an important and lively dispute on the interface between semantics and pragmatics 
that may be interpreted as an effect of this problem. Semantic minimalists defend a traditional 
frame where semantics determines the content of what is said by a sentence. It does so by allow-
ing us to specify the proposition an utterance expresses in the light of the conventional meanings 
of words, compositional rules for combining them, and some objective and innocuous features 
of the context. According to authors like Bach (2004), Cappelen and Lepore (2005), or Borg 
(2006), pragmatic processes would take all of that as an input and use it inferentially in order to 
find out the communicative intention of the speaker – and perhaps what speech acts have been 
actually performed. In contrast to this, defenders of pragmatic intrusion, like Recanati (2010) or 
Jaszczolt (2005), claim that there is no way to specify the content of what is said in any relevant 
sense, unless we take into consideration the pragmatic context. And this crucially includes the 
intentions with which speakers made their utterances. An effect of this sort of position, some-
times labelled as contextualist, is that it implies quite a radical attack on the autonomy of semantic 
deliberations, which would depend on pragmatic concerns.
This debate has significant implications for the very possibility of the Gricean project. If 
some form of contextualism is right, it seems that the input to pragmatic inference would not 
be constructed prior to pragmatics itself. If what is said is the starting point for the hearer to 
find out the speaker’s communicative intentions and, at the same time, pragmatic inference on 
the agential intentions of speakers is a must to determine what is said, then it seems that we are 
enclosed in circular reasoning. This is what Levinson (1995; 2000: 186) called Grice’s circle – a 
problem affecting the very basis of pragmatics that seems to be still on the table.
The battlefield of this debate is thus the notion of what is said. According to some authors, its 
content is some sort of ‘minimal proposition’, which ought later to be specified or qualified by 
means of pragmatic processes; according to others, we may not attribute any content to it before 
pragmatic inferences on the intentions of the participants are made. Remembering the two 
senses of intention exposed at the beginning of this chapter, we may say that it is the autonomy 
of the intentionality of language that is at stake: semantic minimalists attribute intentionality to 
linguistic expressions themselves, whereas contextualists and defendants of pragmatic intrusion 
claim that we may find no fully fledged intentionality in language unless we take the intentional 
character of agency into consideration.
Between internalism and externalism
Many areas of philosophy employ a famous distinction between internalism and externalism, 
which roughly classifies theories depending on their proneness to rely on mental features of the 
person or facts about the world around her in order to account for some phenomenon. Apply-
ing this distinction to pragmatics, Harnish (2009) has claimed that theories of speech inspired 
by Austin or Searle are prone to postulate external conditions, since they try to explain the 
workings of speech acts by making conventions, rules, and norms explicit, while those inspired 
by Grice are more inclined to internalism, since they understand communication as a process of 
unveiling communicative intentions.
Even if making a clear-cut classification of different pragmatic theories according to this 
distinction does not seem possible, the tension between internalism and externalism is mani-
fest in the literature. A good example is the discussion of the way the content of demonstra-
tives may be determined. David Kaplan (1977) famously proposed that demonstratives are 
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incomplete unless accompanied by an overt physical demonstration, since the linguistic rules 
that govern their use are not sufficient to determine their referents. However, Kaplan himself 
later argued against this idea, claiming that the ‘directing intention’ of the speaker determines 
what is the target of the demonstrative (Kaplan 1989). He thus moved from an externalist 
to an internalist position. This step was criticised by Reimer (1991), who claimed that only 
manifest, observable, ostensive gestures are semantically significant, regardless of the speaker’s 
intentions. This, again, is a clearly externalist position – see further discussion in Mount (2008) 
and King (2014).
This is an epistemological issue that would not be deprived of important consequences for 
research in pragmatics, affecting our methodological strategies to confront empirical data. A rad-
ically externalist position would preclude us from including features about the speakers’ minds 
in our descriptions of their communicative exchanges. And even if we were allowed to describe 
the conversational scene in cognitive terms, the notion of intention could still be banned for 
different reasons. For instance, an author like Bach (2006) is known for having resisted admitting 
intentions as a part of the context on the grounds that context ought be understood as the basis 
the hearer has when she tries to infer the speaker’s intentions – a reservation that might also be 
found in Fodor and Lepore (2004).
In order to properly assess those refusals, it is crucial to stipulate the notion of context under 
consideration: on one hand, there is the Austinian idea of context as ‘the total speech act in 
the total speech situation’ (Austin 1962: 147), where it is hard to deny that intentions are an 
important part (unless we also wanted to impeach the whole intentional account of action); but, 
on the other hand, there is an epistemic notion of context, which is the basis for the hearer’s 
inferential processes. Either understood as some form of ‘common knowledge’ between speaker 
and hearer (Lewis 1969), or as ‘mutual knowledge’ among them (Schiffer 1972), the epistemic 
context is what speaker and hearer allegedly share before the communication of new informa-
tion takes place. It is here where the presence of intentions may seem controversial (Bach 2006: 
546). Bach seems right in claiming that it does not make any sense to introduce the speaker’s 
communicative intention as a part of the epistemic context that allows the hearer to infer that 
very same intention, since otherwise communication itself would be futile. However, I would 
say that nothing in his arguments forces us to exclude other intentions the speaker may have as 
a part of the epistemic context that allows the hearer to infer some current communicative or 
illocutionary intention. For instance: if other intentions have been previously manifested, then 
they may be part of the shared or common epistemic context, which allows the hearer to infer 
the speaker’s specific intentions at some given moment.
In this sense, what we need is a deeper understanding of what it is to make an intention 
public or manifest, allowing it to become a part of the epistemic context. Mitchell Green (2007) 
is putting forward ideas in this respect that could be ground-breaking. Elaborating on empirical 
data in the field of biosemiotics, he explains the way in which hidden states and capacities of ani-
mals may be made manifest by means of external signs, insofar as those signs have been selected 
with the function to make those hidden states overt to others. They are even better indicators 
if they are costly to produce, because then they are hard to imitate by fakers, becoming ‘handi-
caps’. In Green’s opinion, speech acts ought to be understood along these lines, as a particular 
kind of ‘handicap’ (2009): they are produced to allow speakers to manifest their intentions in the 
social scene, and an imbalance between what is manifested and what actually takes place in the 
speaker’s mind is punished with social exclusion. In the end, the frontier between natural and 
non-natural meaning (as the one between the internal and the external) may not be as deep as 
we initially thought it was.




Up to this moment, I have described a model where each individual utterance is explained in 
terms of its intentional origins, considering each utterance as an independent act motivated by 
some psychological state of the speaker. However, a recent trend in pragmatics promotes a differ-
ent approach, focussed on the interactional and collaborative character of conversation. Instead 
of accounting for speech performance as a sequence of individual and independent utterances 
chained in serial exchanges, some scholars propose to look at it as a whole process of social 
interaction, performed simultaneously by all the participants (Bara 2010). In some cases, this 
theoretical shift is put forward as an abandonment of the intentional account in favour of some 
alternative possibility (Arundale 2008), whereas in other cases a similar emphasis on the dialogic 
and negotiated character of communication does not seem to imply such a deep breach with the 
intentional account (Thomas 1995; Haugh 2009, 2013, Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012).
There are serious doubts that a simple causal model of folk psychological explanations, based 
on the idea that each individual action is the effect of some particular intention in the mind 
of the speaker, could do all the explanatory work required to account for the complex ways in 
which agents are held responsive for their words and interact with others by means of speech. In 
this sense, discussion of the role of agential intentions in communication and speech acts may be 
illuminated by recent developments in the theory of action, which encourage us to go beyond 
the cognitive-causal notion of intention that sustains the standard account of action. Besides 
their mental states being the cause of their behaviour, agents are present in their actions in other 
complex ways, by means of which they make sense of their deeds as their own. To account for 
this complex kind of belonging or recognition there are different theoretical instruments at our 
disposal: not just a standard causal theory of mind (Davidson 1980), but more complex ways to 
elucidate the rationality of action, such as meta-representational capacities to form second-order 
beliefs, desires, or intentions about our own first-order mental states, in order to guide them 
towards what is really important for us (Frankfurt 1988); capacities of prevision and projection, 
articulated in temporally structured planning strategies oriented towards social coordination 
(Bratman 1987); or the ability to integrate events in narratives, whose coherence and intelligibil-
ity allows us to consider them as a meaningful part of our own biography (Ricœur 1994; Velle-
man 2009). This seemingly theoretical disquisition could be illuminating in empirical research in 
order to make sense of the way agents seem to negotiate with others the meaning and force of 
their utterances, while they try to get along by means of speech. And, although these clues impel 
us to look beyond intentions, following them could be the only way to attain a really successful 
intentional account of language.
Suggestions for further reading
Grice, H. P. (1989) Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Collects the classic papers that initiated the study of language in terms of communicative intentions, and 
the project of intention-based semantics.
Searle, J. R. (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Is his systematic development of Austin’s seminal ideas: an account of speech acts theory based on constitu-
tive rules.
Green, M. S. (2007) Self-Expression. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Contains a recent development of speech acts theory, well informed on biological and evolutionary facts.
Haugh, M. (2008) ‘Intention in pragmatics’, Intercultural Pragmatics, 5(2): 99–110.
A collection of recent papers discussing intentions’ role in pragmatics from different perspectives.
O’Connor, T. and Sandis, C. (eds.) (2010) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
A comprehensive collection of papers that addresses the main issues in the theory of action.
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